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Emerging economies may grow fast because there is a potential for catching-up. In this paper foreign
knowledge spillovers raise productivity of R&D in the exposed sector. The higher the productivity
gap the more profitable investment in R&D will be. As a result labour productivity in the production
department of the exposed sector rises fast. The sheltered sector realizes no productivity increases
but gains because the terms of trade rise in favour of non-tradables. In the long run the rate of
growth of the economy converges to the exogenous world rate. Capital mobility speeds up the
process of convergence at the expense of accumulating foreign debt. Moreover, temporary shocks
have long lasting effects as the economy exhibits hysteresis in case of perfect capital mobility.
Regulation in the sheltered sector induces mark-up pricing and a decline in the demand for non-
tradables. The market for tradables expands and it becomes more profitable to invest in R&D.
Regulation of this kind as is often practised in developing countries thus enhances economic growth.
Again the results differ whether or not capital mobility is assumed. Maintaining equilibrium on the
balance of trade leads to a higher long-run aggregate consumption level, which may explain the
often observed reluctance to introduce free international capital mobility.
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In neoclassical growth theory emerging economies are characterized by a relatively low
capital intensity. The scarcity of capital implies a high rate of return on investment and a
corresponding high rate of growth. Alternatively, one could assume that emerging
economies lack the knowledge to produce at the same level as developed economies.
Knowledge can of course be imitated and the relevance of international knowledge
spillovers is wel documented (e.g. Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman and
Hofmaister, 1995). However, to absorb such knowledge spillovers it may be necessary to
develop a firm-specific or tacit knowledge base. Emerging economies may then be
characterized by a technical disadvantage, which can be overcome by investing sufficiently
in R&D. Therefore, emerging economies may grow fast because there is potential for
“catching-up”.
In this paper we analyse catching up in in the context of a small open economy
with two sectors. The exposed or tradables sector consists of a number of specialized
producers which have to compete in the international market by setting prices and
investing in R&D. The economy is relatively backward because firms in the exposed
sector stay behind in knowledge vis a vis the rest of the world. This implies two things.
First, there is a potential for imitation. Second, investment in R&D in the emerging
economy commands a high rate of return. Both factors contribute to a rate of growth in
excess of that in the rest of the world, so that the exposed sector catches up. There is no
technological change in the sheltered or non-tradables sector, but workers in this sector
benefit from growth in the exposed sector as the terms of trade move in favour of non-
tradables (Balassa effect).
It is assumed that the sheltered sector is subject to some form of regulation, which
restricts output and increases prices. Therefore, regulation is tantamount to imperfect
competition and can be conceived as a form of mark-up pricing. If output in the sheltered
sector is restricted the exposed sector benefits and investment in R&D becomes more
profitable. As a consequence regulation in the sheltered sector fastens growth and may for
that reason be interpreted as a kind of development strategy, be it deliberate or not.
Whether it is also optimal from the point of consumer welfare remains to be seen.
An important aspect of the present analysis is the prevailing regime with respect to
international capital mobility. We distinguish two extreme case, i.e. balanced trade and
perfect capital mobility. The results differ substantially among regimes. In case of capital
mobility the emerging economy incurs debt, which has to be serviced in the long run.
Policy authorities may dislike this result and opt for a restriction on the international
movements of capital. Under capital mobility the economy exhibits hysteresis. Under these
circumstances temporary measures will have long lasting effects. In particular, symmetric
countries that are hit by asymmetric temporary shocks will not converge to the same
productivity level.
1It may be useful to relate our analysis to the existing literature. The engine of
growth applied in the present paper is borrowed from our earlier work on endogenous
growth (Smulders and Van de Klundert, 1995; Van de Klundert en Smulders, 1997).
There is a number of theoretical papers on catching-up driven by a knowledge gap but
most papers assume that emerging economies learn from doing (e.g. Lucas, 1993, Maggi,
1993; Van de Klundert and Smulders, 1996; Basu and Weil, 1996). In the present model
the backward economy has a substantial potential for investing in new knowledge. In
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) international diffusion of knowledge requires investment
by the recipient country, but there is no international trade in the model. Two-sector open
economies are analysed in Turnovsky and Sen (1991, 1995). The authors discuss changes
in government expenditure and supply shocks in a neoclassical world with perfect capital
mobility. The Turnovsky-Sen models are less complicated than our model, because they
assume perfect competition. In our analysis firms in the exposed sector compete
monopolistically at home and abroad. Prices of tradables as well as prices of non-tradables
have therefore to be solved.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the model for the
dependent economy and its behavioural implications. Section 3 is devoted to an analysis of
the steady state characteristics of the system. Equilibrium dynamics is discussed in Section
4, applying a linearized version of the model. Moreover, both regimes with respect to the
balance of payments have to be treated separately. The dynamics in case of capital
mobility turns out to be rather complicated. For this reason catching-up fenomena and
regulation in the sheltered sector are discussed in more detail by presenting numerical
examples in Section 5. The paper closes with some conclusions. Technicalities are
delegated to a number of Appendices.
22. The dependent economy
2.1. Feasible growth
Preferences and technology are specified in Table A. Consumers trade off future
consumption for present consumption according to a CRRA utility function with a
measure of risk aversion r and pure rate of time preference J, equation (A.1). They make
a choice at every instant of time between non-tradables CY and tradables CX according to
the Cobb-Douglas specification in equation (A.2). The X-good in the consumption menue
consists of a bundle of N domestic goods and nN foreign goods. Here n stands for the
number of countries from which goods are imported. Variables with an upper bar relate to
the outside world. The number of domestic and foreign varieties of X-goods is given.
These goods are imperfect substitutes as shown in equation (A.3). The elasticity of
substitution is constant and equals > 1.
Non-tradables are consumed or used as inputs in the production of tradables. These
goods are produced by applying labour in a fixed proportion as shown in equations (A.4)
and (A.5). There is no technical change in the Y-goods sector. Goods in the exposed sector
are produced by labour and inputs from the non-tradables sector with a Cobb-Douglas
technology, equation (A.6). Factor productivity in each branch of the tradables sector can
be improved by employing labour for R&D, as appears from equation (A.7). Innovation
builds upon a knowledge base, which is the result of in-house or firm-specific knowledge
accumulated in the past (h) and of domestic spillovers as well as of foreign spillovers.
These spillover effects are related to average knowledge levels at home (H) and abroad
(H). There are diminishing returns with respect to firm-specific knowledge (0 < ah + af <
1) but constant returns with respect to the knowledge base as a whole.
Labour market equilibrium implies that the amount of labour available (L) equals
total labour demand as expressed by the LHS of equation (A.8) Tradables are consumed at
home or exported as appears from equation (A.9). Trade with the outside world is
governed by alternative assumptions with respect to international capital mobility. In
equations (A.10) we consider two regimes. In case of current account equilibrium exports
equals imports and the LHS of (A.10) equals zero. The other case considered is perfect
international capital mobility, which allows the domestic economy to accumulate foreign
assets, A, which bear a fixed rate of interest (r=r ). It should be observed that prices of
domestic varieties of the X-good are not given. Each producer of X-goods holds a unique
position in the world economy because he or she is the sole supplier of a product variety.
Therefore prices of export goods or import-competing goods can be set in the domestic
economy. Prices of imported goods are of course determined abroad.
Feasible growth paths satisfy equations (A.1) - (A.10). We assume that the
domestic economy is small relative to the ROW. Hence, foreign variables are determined
by foreign conditions only and can be considered as exogenous variables. Preferences as
well as production technology and R&D technology in the ROW are the same as in the
3domestic economy. In addition, it will be assumed that the ROW exhibits steady state
growth with constant. By choice of numeraire, prices of foreign tradables pxi
are also constant in the steady state. Which path is selected by the domestic economy
under these conditions depends on the behaviour of firms and consumers as well as on the
regime prevailing in the international capital market.




1−s,0 < s < 1 (A.2)
, > 1 (A.3)
Technology: , (A.4)
, (A.5)







C aggregate consumption index N number of firms in a country
CY non-tradable consumption n number of countries
CX tradable high tech consumption index L labour supply
cxi consumption of high-tech good iL klabour allocated in sector/division k,
Yxi (non-tradable) intermediates k = Y, xi, ri.
xi production of high-tech good i
h labour productivity f fixed labour cost
H average labour productivity in A Net foreign assets
national high-tech sector
a bar denotes a foreign variable.
42.2 Behaviour
Consumers maximize the intemporal utility function in three stages subject to budget
constraints. The three stage budgeting system is formulated in Table B. In the first stage,
each consumer decides on the path of aggregate consumption over time, taking into
account the accumulation of financial assets F.
1 The nominal interest rate r is exogenous
in case of perfect international capital mobility. Otherwise r is determined endogenously
by domestic savings and investment. The wage rate is denoted by w. Profits accruing to
consumers are symbolised by P. The second stage divides consumption over tradables and
non-tradables. In the third stage, consumers decide about spending on the different
varieties of the tradable good produced at home or produced abroad. The maximization
procedure gives rise to the familiar Ramsey rule, equation (B.4) and demand equations for
non-tradables (B.5), domestically produced tradables (B.6) and imported goods (B.7). The
procedure also generates price indices for consumption (B.8) and tradables (B.9) in the
domestic economy.
Table B Consumer behaviour
Maximization of consumer preferences (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3) subject to, respectively:
(B.1)
CXPX +C Y P Y=C P C (B.2)
(B.3)
yields: (B.4)





Pk price (index) of good (aggregate) k, with k = C, X, Y, xi, xj.
w wage
r interest rate
1 Financial assets include shares issued by domestic firms, domestic consumer loans and foreign
assets. In the absence of capital mobility foreign assets are equal to zero.
5Producer behaviour is summarized in Table C. Demand for each product variety
comes from domestic and from foreign consumers as shown in equation (C.2). Producers
consider total consumer demand CX and CX as well as the corresponding price indices PX
and PX as given. Profit maximization therefore results in a mark-up over marginal cost
which is equal to the factor /( −1)ºµX, equation (C.3). The cost-minimizing factor input
combination follows from equation (C.4).
The optimal R&D-strategy implies that the marginal value product of labour
employed in research phixKi should be equated to the marginal cost of labour (w), as is
shown in equation (C.5). The shadow price of the knowledge base phi is introduced as a
Lagrangian multiplier in the maximization procedure. Firms face a trade-off with respect
to investing in knowledge as appears from the no-arbitrage condition in equation (C.6).
This condition says that investing a fixed amount of money in the capital market (the RHS
of (C.6)) should yield the same revenue as investing that same amount of money in
knowledge production. The latter raises factor productivity in commodity production and
hence revenue (first term on the LHS of (C.6), it raises also the knowledge base in R&D
(second term) and it yields a capital gain (last term).
Table C Producer behaviour.
X-sector: (C.1)
(C.2)






Y-sector: PY =µ Yw/h Y (C.7)
µY mark-up rate in the Y-sector
6The product in the non-tradable Y-sector is homogeneous, but regulation of
competition may limit the number of competitors. Oligopolistic behaviour may then induce
strategic behaviour. However, to simplify the analysis it is assumed that producers of non-
tradables apply a fixed mark-up factor (µY) over marginal cost, equation (C.7).
Throughout the paper we assume that domestic firms are symmetric. Hence we
may drop all subscripts i and j (for all i we have hi=h, pxi=p, etc.) .
3. The steady state
The model can be conveniently reduced to a number of key relationships. Appendix II
derives six semi-reduced forms which can be interpreted as the savings decision,
investment decision, labour market equilibrium, equilibrium in the markets for tradables
and for non-tradables, balance of payment equilibrium and the balance of payment regime
(see table F). As shown in Appendix III, the semi-reduced model easily reveals the steady
state conditions which are further discussed in this section.







Equilibrium in the market for non-tradables:
. (D.4)
Balance of payments equilibrium:
. (D.5)
Balance of payments regime:
A=0 (balanced trade) or A¹0 (perfect capital mobility) (D.6)
7In the steady state, productivity levels in the domestic tradables sector grow at the
same rate as abroad, i.e. at given rate g. The allocation of labour and the knowledge gap
h/h are constant. The balanced growth path can be characterized as
The price of imported goods is set equal to unity (px=1). The price of tradables should
therefore be constant in the domestic economy (˙ px=0).
Table D displays five key relationships that hold in the steady state. Equation (D.1)
- (D.5) can be used to find the steady state solutions in h and Lx. Substitution of (D.1) in
(D.2) results in a first equation in these variables. Substitution of CPC/w according to
equation (D.5) in (D.4) and substitution of the result in equation (D.3) gives the second





In case of current account equilibrium or balanced trade the net foreign asset
position equals zero (A = 0). In that case the sign of the partial derivations with respect to
the parameters can easily be established
.
An increase in the number of firms (N), an increase in fixed cost (f) or an improvement in
R&D efficiency (x) leads to a lower productivity level in the exposed sector in relation to
the productivity level abroad (h). The same result is obtained if the rate of time preference
8(J), the rate of risk aversion (r) or the share of income spend on tradables (s) is raised.
Spillover effects whether of domestic origin (ah) or of foreign origin (ah) have a negatieve
impact on the knowledge gap. An increase in µY, which can be associated with more
regulation in the sheltered sector, has a positive effect on the productivity level in the
exposed sector. It can be concluded that regulation in the sheltered sector helps to
modernize the exposed sector. On the other hand less intensive competition in the exposed
sector leading to a higher mark-up factor (µX) induces a lower productivity level.
The signs of the derivatives with respect to employment in the production of
tradables (Lx) help explaining the results with respect to changes in the level of knowledge
in the domestic economy. An increase in N reduces the size of firms in the exposed
sector, which makes R&D less attractive. A rise in f or µX leads to a reduction in the
production of tradables with a similar effect on R&D. A higher time preference, an
increase in risk aversion or a shift in preferences towards tradables induces a higher
consumption level. In this case labour is reallocated from R&D activities towards
production of tradables as well as non-tradables. Higher spillover effects have a negative
impact on the incentive to invest in R&D. As a result some labour in R&D laboratories
becomes redundant so that a reallocation towards production departments in both sectors
becomes necessary. More regulation in the sheltered sector sets labour free for production
and R&D activities in the exposed sector. Finally, it should be noted that an increase in x
has no effect on the allocation of labour. The rise in productivity comes entirely from the
increase in R&D efficiency.
In case of perfect capital mobility the dependent economy may accumulate foreign
assets. Differentiation of equations (1) and (2) with respect to the level of real foreign
assets yields:
An increase in foreign assets expressed in wage units raises capital income from abroad in
real terms. Higher income boosts consumption and production of non-tradables, and
crowds out domestic high-tech production and R&D. Lower investment in national
research results in a larger productivity gap. Alternatively, one could say that there is a
trade-off between the two assets, foreign claims and firm-specific knowledge.
Whether foreign assets will be accumulated or not depends on the history of the
economy. Perfect capital mobility gives rise to path-dependency, as will be shown in the
next section.
94. Equilibrium dynamics
To study the dynamics it is convenient to linearize the model around the steady state. The
key relationships in linearized form are given in Table E. Variables with a tilde relate to
percentage deviations from their steady state solutions i.e. ˜ xºdx/x. The variable ˜ a is
defined as the obsolute deviation of A/h from its steady state solution, i.e. ˜ aºda. The
linearization procedure is explained in Appendix IV.







Equilibrium in the (world) market for tradables:
. (E.4)
Equilibrium in the market for non-tradables:
. (E.5)
Balance of payments equilibrium:
. (E.6)
Balance of payments regime:
(balanced trade) or (perfect capital mobility) (E.7)
Note: we have assumed s®0 (small country assumption) and defined zºx(h/h)
−af, ˜ a=d(A/h).
104.1 Balanced trade
In case of equilibrium on the current account equation (E.6) can be simplified by setting
. The equations (E.1) - (E.6) can then be applied to derive a set of two linear
differential equations in the level of knowledge (h) and production labour in the exposed
sector (Lx). Equations (D.4) and (D.5) (which are valid also outside the steady state) can
be used to arrive at
. (3)
Linearization of equation (3) implies
. (4)
Substitution of equation (4) in equation (E.3) taking account of the definition of b results
in the first differential equation:
. (5)
Substitution of equation (4) in equation (E.5) gives an expression for ˜ C which can be
differentiated with respect to time. Applying equations (E.1) to eliminate the growth rate
of consumption we arrive after some manipulation at
. (6)
From equations (5) and (6) we see that the locus slopes downward and that the
locus slopes upward. Moreover, it can be easily checked that the determinant of the matrix
of coefficients with respect to ˜ h and ˜ Lx is negative. Therefore, the model is saddlepoint
stable. The phase diagram is shown in Figure 1a. The broken line represents stable arm of
the saddlepath which is the upward sloping as appears from Figure 1a. For an initial value
of the level of knowledge, h(0), the amount of labour allocated to the production of
tradables, Lx, jumps to the stable arm. Thereafter both variables h and Lx adjust towards
the steady state as indicated in Figure 1a. The speed of adjustment is determined by the
negative eigenvalue of the matrix of coefficients with respect to the state variables in
equations (5) and (6).
11Figure 1b Figure 1b
Saddlepath stability More regulation sheltered sector
More regulation in the sheltered sector goes along with an increase in µY. This
leads to an upward shift of the stable arm of the saddlepath as shown in Figure 2b. From
equation (E.1) it appears that the rate of interest does not change in the long run, ˜ r(¥)=0.
Substitution of this result in equation (E.2) gives:
(7)
If the rate of interest is constant a rise in Lx, inducing a higher rate of return on
investment in R&D, has to be compensated by an increase in h, which lowers productivity
in the R&D department. Equation (7) leads to a proportional change of both variables
along the ray OS in Figure 1b. The new steady state is found at point S´. On impact of the
shock, Lx jumps towards the new stable arm. From there on the economy gradually
approaches the new long-run equilibrium. More regulation in the sheltered sector increases
prices of nontradables relative to importables. Imports rise and domestic production has to
rise in order to pay for these imports. Hence Lx jumps up on impact. Larger sales stimulate
incentives for innovation and firms increase R&D efforts. As productivity levels in the
exposed sector rise faster, the price of domestic tradables declines and consumers shift
their consumption further away from non-tradables. Whether it is optimal from a welfare
point of view to increase µY will be discussed in Section 4.
123.2 Perfect capital mobility
Under perfect international capital mobility the domestic rate of interest equals the foreign
rate of interest which is constant. As a consequence: ˜ r=0. Substitution of this result in
equations (E.1) and (E.2) along with substitution of equation (E.5) in equation (E.3) results
in a system of four differential equations in C, h, Lx and a. In the steady state
, but that leaves us with three equations in four unknowns, because
equation (E.1) with ˜ r=0 is always satisfied. This implies that the model exhibits hysteresis:
we need to know the entire transition dynamics to solve for the steady state.
The information contained in equation (E.1) can be preserved by integration of this
equation which yields:
. (8)
where X is the constant of integration, which can be interpreted as the permanent change
in consumption (due to a shock that hits the economy) for given values of ˜ h and ˜ Lx.
Equation (8) can be used to eliminate Lx from the equations in Table E. The
variable can be eliminate by using equation (E.1). As shown in Appendix V, the model
can be reduced to a system of differential equations in three state variables, which can be
written in matrix notation as:
(10)
As explained in Appendix V the permanent consumption effect X can be found along with
the time paths of h, C and a by imposing solvability with respect the net foreign position
and assuming a(0) = 0. Moreover, it is shown there that the dynamics of the model can be
represented by a phase diagram in ˜ h and ˜ C. The slope of the stable manifold depends on
the size of spillovers and the elasticity of demand . For af larger (smaller) than −1
consumption and productivity change in the same (opposite) direction along the transition
path. The intuition behind this result is given below. The relation between net foreign
assets (a) and productivity (h) is negative. Intuitively, investment in domestic knowledge
and investment in foreign assets are substitutes. The two-panel diagrams in Figures 2a and
2b depict the relations among the three state variables ˜ h, ˜ C, and ˜ a. The broken curve in
both figures indicates the stable arm of the saddlepath with respect to ˜ h and ˜ C.
13Figure 2a Figure 2b
small af large af
In order to gain some insight in the time path of consumption, we combine
equation (7) and (8), which results in:
. (9)
The initial jump in high tech employment (˜ Lx) can be derived from (E.2)
2 and substituted
into (9), which yields:
, (11)
where hº−l/[ (zLx/g)−l] and l<0 is the stable root of the dynamic model.
Equation (11) shows that the timing of consumption depends crucially on the
balance between the elasticity of demand for exportables ( ) and spillover parameters. If
af is small relative to −1, consumption grows less over time, i.e. ˜ C(0)> ˜ C(¥). In other
words, consumers wait to save and draw a bill on the future. The reason is that consumer
2 Note that if the stable root of the dynamic model equals l, for any variable ˜ x we may
write . Using this result to eliminate and in (E.4), and subsequently
substituting ˜ r=0, ˜ h(0)=0 and equation (7), we find ˜ Lx(0)=h[ ah−( −1−af)]˜ h(¥), where h is defined
as in the main text.
14prices tend to rise over time. Note that only prices of nontradables matter for the
consumer price index, since the share of home-produced tradables in total tradables
consumption of the small open economy is negligible. Prices of non-tradables depend on
wage costs. Higher productivity in the exposed sector drives up wage costs for the
sheltered sector. Price increases in this sector fuel consumer price inflation
3 which makes
it attractive to consume now rather than in future. However, if af is large, a counterforce
becomes important. Employment and production in the tradables sector will increase
substantially in response to productivity changes (see (7)), which lowers the price of
tradables. Consequently, wage costs fall, and the consumer price index falls. Note that the
price fall in response to a productivity improvement is steeper the lower the price
elasticity is. Hence, if af is large relative to , consumption levels will rise over time
(more than in the initial steady state), and if af is small relative to , consumption will
rise less over time.
Figure 3
Increase in µY
The effects of an increase in µY are illustrated in Figure 3 for the case af > −1.
The locus shifts upward and the locus shifts downward. These shifts imply
a downward movement of the stable arm of the saddlepath. On impact of the shock
consumption declines, but as productivity in the exposed sector improves consumption
goes up again. In the long run productivity has risen, but consumption still stays behind.
3 This can be clearly seen by inspecting equations (AA.14)-(AA.16) in the Appendix.
15The amount of foreign assets declines, because consumers incur foreign debt to smooth
consumption over time.
4
The picture shown in Figure 3 is merely an illustration, because the shift of the
locus and the locus cannot be analytically determined in a meaningful way.
To get a better understanding of the implications of a change in µy numerical examples
may therefore be useful.
4. Numerical examples
Although in case of balanced trade the model can be solved analytically it is instructive to
compare numerical results under both regimes with respect ot the balance of payments.
The parameter values for the reference path are equal to:
5
r=2, J=0.03, s=0.8, =2.5, ah=0.5, af=0.4, x=0.01, g=0.8, µY=1.1, hY=1, f=2.2,
L=100, n=25, N=N=8, g=1.877%.
Because the time paths of the variables are monotonic it is sufficient to present results for
the periods t = 0 and t = ¥.
4.1 Catching up
Catching up occurs when the level of knowledge in relation to the foreign level lies below
the steady state values. In a linearized version of the model this boils down to a negative
deviation of h from its (future) steady state level. The outcomes in case the level of
knowledge in the domestic economy lies 1% below its steady state value under balanced
trade are given in Table 1.
Under balanced trade the system converges to a unique steady state. Catching-up
implies a rise in the knowledge level and a temporary higher rate of growth of total factor
productivity in the exposed sector. As a result of this process consumption of tradables
and non-tradables rises. The initial rate of interest lies above the world level. This makes
it attractive for firms to employ a large share of employment in R&D initially. As the
level of knowledge approaches its steady state level the rate of interest converges towards
the level prevailing in the rest of the world. In the steady state both rates of interest
4 The stable arm of the saddle path shown in the lower panel of Figure 3 does not shift,
because ˜ a(0)=0. See also Turnovsky and Sen (1991).
5 In our numerical example, the rest of the world is characterized by exactly the same
parameters as the domestic economy. Hence, we linearize around a steady state with h/h=1. Note
that by setting h/h=1 and A=0 in equation (1), we find g. The ROW can be considered as a closed
economy with endogenous growth as in Smulders and van de Klundert (1995).
16should be equal because the rates of growth are then equal and consumer preference are
assumed to be the same everywhere, equation (D.1).
Table 1 Catching up (˜ h=−1)
Case Balanced Trade Capital Mobility
Period
Variable
t=0 t®¥ t=0 t®¥
Price tradables ˜ p
Productivity ˜ h
Growth rate ˜ g
Consumption ˜ C
Tradables cons. ˜ CX
Non-tradables cons. ˜ CY
Labour tradables ˜ Lx
Rate of interest ˜ r





































Rate of convergence (%) 1.596 2.109
In case of perfect international capital mobility there is an inflow of foreign capital
to equate interest rates in every period. Consumers as a group are in a position to borrow
abroad in order to smooth consumption over time. The preference for current consumption
implies that consumption declines over time in contrast with the case of balanced trade. In
the long run consumers have to service foreign debt, incurred in the course of the
transition to a steady state. It should be noted that the initial consumption of non-tradables
is relatively high, but so is the consumption of tradables with a relatively higher import
share. The accumulation of knowledge goes beyond the steady state level attained under
balanced trade. The reason is a perfectly elastic of savings, which makes the accumulation
of knowledge easier.
The steady state is not unique. If the economy starts at a level of knowledge which
is 2% below the value attained in the steady state under balanced trade all results for t =
¥ in case of capital mobility double. Therefore, productivity levels are path-dependent and
convergence of countries in terms of productivity levels is arbitrary to some extent. This
result flies in the face of the standard views on convergence in neoclassical theory. Most
of this literature is based on the notion of a closed economy (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
1995). If capital mobility is assumed in a neoclassical context the economy jumps
instantaneously to its unique steady state levels. Physical capital is imported so as to
equate the marginal product of capital with the going rate of interest on world capital
17markets. Partial international mobility of capital in the sense that physical capital can be
used as collateral for international borrowing, but human capital can not gives standard
neoclassical results with the economy adjusting gradually to its unique long-run
equilibrium (cf. Barro, Mankiw, Sala-i-Martin 1992).
Path-dependency of consumption levels is a well-known feature of small open
economies. In response to adverse temporary domestic shocks, foreign borrowing allows
consumers to mitigate the short-run fall in consumption, at the cost of higher debt service
and lower long-run consumption. In a one-sector economy, the accumulation of capital is
not affected as long as the supply of other factors of production (labour) remains the same
so that the physical marginal productivity of capital is not affected (cf. Blanchard and
Fisher, 1989, p.66). However, if the path-dependent change in consumption affects both
tradable and non-tradable production, as in our model, the allocation of labour over the
two sectors is permanently affected. Then also the incentives to accumulate capital in the
different sectors of the economy are permanently affected which results in a long-run
change in the domestic capital stock (see in this connection also Turnovsky and Sen, 1991
and 1995).
4.2. Increasing regulation
The results of a one percent permanent rise in µY are presented in Table 2. An increase of
the mark-up factor in the sheltered sector induces a fall in output and employment on
impact of the shock. As a result R&D becomes more attractive. Under balanced trade the
interest rate rises so that the necessary savings are generated. This implies that the level of
consumption declines in the short run.
Productivity in the tradables sector rises over time. This makes it attractive to
allocate more labour in the production department of the tradables sector. The additional
products can be sold, because the rise in productivity allows for a reduction in prices. The
increase in knowledge reduces the rate of return on investment and in the long run the rate
of interest falls back to its original level as does the rate of growth. However, the long-run
consumption level increases because of a rise in productivity in the exposed sector.
Nevertheless, the measure of intertemporal welfare at t=0 declines under impact of the
weight attached to consumption in the short run.
In case of capital mobility consumption goes up in the short run and the economy
runs a balance of trade deficit. The inflow of capital is sufficient to keep the rate of
interest at the level in the outside world. Compared with the case of balanced trade there
is now less need to increase the production of tradables at t=0. As a consequence there
is more labour available for R&D activities and the level of productivity in the exposed
sector rises faster than under balanced trade as appears from the rate of convergence. The
increase in foreign debt induces a burden in the long run. In the new steady state the
economy must run a trade surplus to service debt. With a perfectly elastic supply of
savings the rise in productivity is higher than under balanced trade. However, exported
18goods have to be sold at a lower price. Long-run consumption falls, but welfare increases
from the vantage point t=0.
Table 2 Increasing regulation (˜ µY=1)
Case Balanced Trade Capital Mobility
Period
Variable
t=0 t=¥ t=0 t=¥
Price tradables ˜ p
Productivity ˜ h
Growth rate ˜ g
Aggr. consumption ˜ C
Tradables cons. ˜ CX
Non-tradables cons. ˜ CY
Labour tradables ˜ Lx
Rate of interest ˜ r










































Rate of convergence (%) 1.596 2.109
Welfare considerations
Changes in welfare depend on the initial value of µY. This can be shown by a sensitivity
analysis with respect to the mark-up factor in the sheltered sectors in the initial steady
state. Figure 4 presents the results. On the vertical axis is the change in intertemporal
welfare as a result of a small increase change in µY. Welfare is the present discounted
value of consumption as of the period of the policy shock. The optimal value µY* for
which the change in welfare equals zero is above unity in both balance of payment
regimes.
Optimal mark-up rates are lower than in a closed economy without growth where
welfare is not distorted if mark-up rates are equal across sectors. This would imply
µY*=µX= /( −1)=1.67 in this example. In the open economy, a rise in µY induces an
expansion of the tradables sector and a loss in the terms of trade as more goods have to be
sold abroad. Therefore the optimal mark-up rate in the non-tradables sector has to be
lower than the mark-up rate prevailing in the tradables sector. Indeed, it can be proven
that a value of µY that equals µX( −1)/ =1 maximizes national welfare of the small open




Welfare effects of regulation
Next, growth effects should be taken into account in the determination of the
welfare maximizing value of µY. Because of knowledge spillovers, high tech firms invest
too little in R&D. When µY is raised, demand for high tech products increases which
boosts the rate of return to innovation. Hence, higher mark-ups in the sheltered sector
provide a second-best instrument to compensate the dynamic distortion in the exposed
sector.
7
Finally, the balance of payment regime plays a role. Capital mobility provides an
additional reason to regulate the sheltered sector. Under capital mobility, regulating the
sheltered sector is a more efficient instrument to compensate the knowledge externality
than under balanced trade so that the optimal µY is larger under the former regime than
under the latter one. Stimulating investment is less costly when the supply of foreign
savings is perfectly elastic. In contrast, when trade has to be balanced, increasing µY result
in temporarily high rates of interest which impose an intertemporal welfare cost. In the
6 This result only holds if the share of domestically produced tradables is negligible in total
consumption (s®0), which is the natural assumption if the country is really small and there is no
"home-preference". With a larger share, we have µY*>1: production of tradables should be
stimulated and their price should be lower, since prices of tradables now influence consumer
prices. Intuitively, the larger s, the more we move to the closed economy caseand the closer µY*
will be to µX.
7 Only domestic spillovers matter in this respect. Foreign spillovers provide a flow of
knowledge like manna from heaven. From a national perspective, no policy can influence this so it
is not an externality that a small open economy can internalize.
20absence of national knowledge spillovers (ah=0), both regimes call for zero regulation
(µY=1).
8
Excessive regulation (policies that set µY above µY*) bring about welfare losses.
Figure 4 shows that the welfare losses are smaller in the regime of capital mobility than in
the regime of balanced trade if regulation is modest. However, if the sheltered sector is
heavily regulated, balanced trade performs better. First note that under capital mobility, the
optimal level of regulation is higher, so that starting from modestly high µY society still
reaps welfare gains by regulating under capital mobility, while under balanced trade it
incurs losses. However, note also that welfare is more sensitive to regulation under capital
mobility than under balanced trade (compare the slope of the two curves in Figure 4).
Supply of funds is perfectly elastic which allows investment to be more sensitive to
changes in innovation incentives. Excess regulation creates overaccumulation of the
national knowledge stock and expansion of tradables that is larger than under balanced
trade. The associated larger deterioration in the terms of trade makes capital mobility
perform worse.
X-inefficiency
Returning to regulation, it is often argued that regulation in the sheltered sector induces X-
inefficiency. In our model a change in X-inefficiency can be introduced in the form of an
autonomous change of labour productivity in the sheltered sector (hY). A rise in hY leads to
an immediate decline in consumption levels, but has no effect on the accumulation of
knowledge. This can easily be checked in case of balanced trade. Inspection of the
equations (5) and (6) reveals that there is no term in ˜ hY. A similar result holds in case of
capital mobility as appears from numerical simulation of the system of equations in (10).
Intuitively, a decline in output of non-tradables caused by a fall in labour productivity
induces a proportional increase in the price of these goods. This induces a proportial
decline of the demand for non-tradables. This implies that there is no need for a
reallocation of labour. Consumption of tradables also declines, because producers apply
less non-tradables in the production process. The welfare consequences of induced X-
inefficiency, if any, have to be taken into account in a final assessment of regulation in the
sheltered section.
8 Provided again that s®0.
215. Conclusions
Emerging economies are able to catch up by investing in R&D. The larger the knowledge
gap, the higher the rate of return and the faster growth. The international capital market
can boost convergence because additional investment can be financed without inducing a
rise in the interest rate. This allows consumers to take an advance on future welfare by
smooting consumption over time.
Under capital mobility, temporary country-specific shocks have permanent effects
on net foreign asset positions and productivity (hysteresis). Hence, countries that are
symmetric in economic structure and technological and social capability may hold
different net foreign asset positions which result in different total factor productivity
levels. This may explain for the lack of productivity convergence in open economies (cf.
Bernard and Jones 1996).
In developing countries, the sheltered sector may be operating on the basis of
traditional rules and norms. As a result, the absence of perfectly competitive markets may
cause mark-up rates in this sector. Deregulation would lower markup rates. However,
national economic policies that deliberately abstain from reducing high markup rates in the
sheltered sector of the economy may boost national productivity growth. Such a strategy
may offset dynamic distortions in the economy because of knowledge spillovers, so that
regulation in the sheltered sector may improve welfare.
However, when markup rates in the sheltered sector become too large, welfare
losses will occur. Productivity growth in the dynamic exposed sector of the economy will
be high, but at the cost of severe price distortions. Capital flows will exacerbate the
overaccumulation of capital, so that welfare losses are larger under capital mobility than
under balanced trade. International capital mobity aggrevate policy mistakes. National
policy authorities may therefore adopt capital flow restrictions in small open economies in
order to mitigate the adverse welfare effects of mistakes in regulation and other growth
enhancing policies.
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23Appendix I. Solving for Price Variables
With symmetric firms within the country, all domestic firms charge the same price and
consumption levels of any good from a certain country are the same. The foreign price of
high tech goods is taken as the numerair.
pxi =pfor all i,
cxi = cx for all i.
pxj = 1 for all j and all t.
The valueshare of home-produced high-tech goods in total high-tech consumption, s, can
be found from (B.6) and (B.7):
. (AA.1)
The small open economy assumption implies that N is negligible relative to nN, so that
s®0. Hence, the consumer price index PC depends on PY and p only. We find an
expression for PY by eliminating w between (C.7) and (C.5):
. (AA.2)
From (B.8), (AA.2), the small country assumption (s®0), and the choice of numeraire
(p=1 for all t), we find:
. (AA.3)
We assume that preferences are equal and homothetic across the world. This means
that any pair of goods is consumed everywhere in the same ratio as it is produced:
. (AA.4)
where the last equality follows from (B.6) and (B.7).
Combining (A.6), (C.4) and (C.7), we find:
, (AA.5)
which holds also for foreign variables. Substitution of (AA.5) in (AA.4) gives:
, (AA.6)
24, (AA.7)
where we have assumed that balanced growth prevails in the rest of the world so that Lx is
constant.







Equilibrium in the (world) market for tradables:
. (F.4)
Equilibrium in the market for non-tradables:
. (F.5)
Balance of payments equilibrium:
. (F.6)
Balance of payments regime:
˙ A=A=0 (balanced trade) or r=r (perfect capital mobility) (F.7)
Note: we assume that domestic firms are symmetric, that the rest of the world consists of identical
countries, that domestic and foreign preferences and production functions symmetric, and that the
foreign price is numeraire (pxi=1). The variable s is defined as the share of home-produced high tech
goods in total high tech goods consumption.
25Appendix II. Key relationships
Table F contains seven key relationships of the model in the variables C, r, h, Lx,L YC,p ,
P C ,w , and A. This section of the appendix explains how to derive these semi-reduced
forms. In the next sections of the appendix , we use the results (i) to characterize the
steady state, and (ii) to linearize the model and study the dynamics.
We derive the Ramsey equation in (F.1) by combining (B.4), (AA.3) and (AA.7).
The equation that characterizes the investment decision is found by substitution of
the appropriate equations in equation (C.6). First, divide the equation by phi. Eliminate x,
p, and phi in the first term by substituting (C.3), (AA.5) and (C.5) respectively. Eliminate
Lri and phi in the second term by substituting (A.7) and (C.5) respectively. The rate of
change of the price of knowledge that appears in third term can be rewritten as ˆ ph =ˆ p+
a f ( ˆ h−g) by differentiating (C.5), taking into account that h=H, and using (C.3) and (C.7)
to eliminate ˆ w. We find (F.2) when we finally substitute (AA.7) to eliminate ˆ p and
introduce the definition
, (AA.8)
where the last equality follows from the symmetry assumption.
The labour market equation in (F.3) is derived as follows. From the symmetry
assumption and equations (A.5), (C.4) and (C.7), we find
. (AA.9)
Substitution of this result and (AA.8) into (A.8) yields (F.3).
Equation (F.4) replicates (AA.6). Equation (F.5) is found by combination of
equations (B.5), (C.7) and (A.4).
In order to find the Balance of Payments equation, we substitute (B.3), (B.2) and
(B.5) into (A.10), take into account symmetry, and find:
. (AA.10)
Eliminating x and p, by substituting (AA.5) and (C.3) respectively, we arrive (F.6).
Appendix III. Steady State (Table D)
The steady state is characterized (defined) by constant growth rates. Equation (F.3) implies
that Lx, LYC and zºx(h/h)
−af should be constant. It can be checked from (F.5) and (F.6) that
A/w should be constant. Hence, in the steady state we may write:
26. (AA.11)
Then it follows from (AA.7), (AA.9) and (F.3) and from (AA.3), (AA.5), (AA.2), (C.7),
and (F.5) respectively that:
, (AA.12)
. (AA.13)
Substituting (AA.11)-(AA.13) into the key relationships in table F, we find their steady
state counterparts which are displayed in table D in the main text.
Appendix IV. Linearization of the model (Table E)
The purpose of this section is to find the linearized version of the model in terms of the
four main variables, viz. h, Lx,c , and a, and three variables of secondary interest, viz. p, r,
LYC. We introduce the variable aºA/hpxi (which equals a=A/h by our choice of the
numeraire) which should be interpreted as the ratio of net foreign assets to domestic
assets. We choose this variable because it is a predetermined variable (note that the ratio
A/w which is used in section 3 is not), which allows us to exploit the condition ˜ a(0)=0.
Our linearization procedure involves taking total differentiation, where all
parameters except µY and hY are considered as constants. Tilded variables are expressed as
relative deviations from the initial balanced growth path, i.e. for any variable u, ˜ uºdu/u or
du=u˜ u, so that dˆ u= . An exception is ˜ a which is defined as the absolute (rather than
relative) deviation from the original growth path, i.e. ˜ aºda and d˙ a= , which allows us to
consider the situation in which A=a=0 initially (balanced trade).
Equations (E.1)-(E.4) directly follow from linearization of equations (F.1), (F.2),
(F.3) and (F.4). In order to find equation (E.5), we first linearize (F.5). The resulting
equation contains terms with ˜ PC−˜ w, which we want to eliminate. In order to find an
expression for ˜ PC−˜ w, first note from (B.8), (B.9), the symmetry assumption, the small
country assumption (s®0), and the choice of the numerair (p=1) that:
. (AA.14)
Linearization of (C.7) and (C.3) gives:
(AA.15)
(AA.16)
27Linearizing (F.5) and substituting (AA.14), (AA.15), (AA.16) and (E.4), we find (E.5).
In order to find a convenient Balance-of-Payments relationship, we divide (F.5) by
h and rewrite the equation in terms of aºA/h instead of A:
.
Linearizing this expression (recalling our definition ˜ aºda), substituting (AA.14), (AA.15),
and (AA.16) to eliminate ˜ PC and ˜ w, and substituting (E.4), we arrive at (E.6).
The six equations (E.1)-(E.6) contain seven variables (viz. ˜ w, ˜ r, ˜ C, ˜ Lx, ˜ h, ˜ LYC,˜ a ).
The equation that completes the system depends on which of the two Balance of Payment
regimes applies. (E.7) summarizes the two regimes.
V. Solving the dynamics under Perfect capital Mobility
Representation of the model by three differential equations
Substitution of (E.5) and (E.7b) into (E.1)-(E.3) and (E.6) yields a system of four
differential equations in the variables ˜ c, ˜ Lx, ˜ h, and ˜ a. As explained in the main text, the
dynamic system exhibits hysteresis and we need to further reduce the system. To this end
we take the integral of (E.1) with ˜ r=0. It gives the expression that allows to eliminate Lx:
, (AA.17)
where X is the constant of integration. Using this result to eliminate ˜ Lx and in (E.32),
we find (for ˜ r=0):
. (AA.18)
The elimination of LYC between (E.3) and (E.5) and substitution of (AA.17) in the
resulting expression gives the expression for . Since we want to compare the regime of
perfect capital mobility to that of balanced trade, we linearize around an initial steady state
without net foreign assets. Hence we may substitute equation (3) from the main text. The













Finally we derive a differential equation for net foreign assets a. Use (AA.17) to
eliminate ˜ Lx in (E.6). Under the condition of zero initial net foreign assets, this gives the
third differential equation in (10).
Solving the dynamic system
From (10) and the initial conditions for the predetermined variables h and a we have to
solve the time paths of ˜ h, ˜ c, and ˜ a, and the unknown constant X.
To start with, note that the first two differential equation can be solved independently of ˜ a.
In particular, we can draw a Phase diagram in a ˜ h, ˜ c plane. Saddle-point stability applies
under mild conditions (if downward sloping, the ˙ c=0 locus should be less steep than the
˙ h=0 locus, which is violated only for very small values of r). Two possibilities arise
because of the ambiguous sign of a21.I fa fis large, a21 is negative, implying that the ˙ c=0
29locus and the stable manifold slope upward (a sufficient condition is af> −1). If af is
small, the ˙ c=0 locus and the stable manifold slope downward.
Ignoring the third differential equation, we can solve ˜ h and ˜ c as a function of time
t, the unknown constant X, and the given shocks to the system ˜ h0, ˜ µY, and ˜ hY. Denoting the
vector of shocks by ˜ z and the stable (negative) root by l, we can express the solutions as:
˜ h = ˜ h(t, X, ˜ h0,˜ µ Y ,˜ h Y )=e
l t˜ h 0 + (1−e
lt) ˜ h(¥,X,˜ z) (AA.19)
˜ c = ˜ c(t, X, ˜ h0,˜ µ Y ,˜ h Y )=e
l t˜ c (0,X,˜ z) + (1−e
lt) ˜ c(¥,X,˜ z) (AA.20)
Next we have to solve for ˜ a and X. To this end we use the third differential equation and
two natural restrictions on the value of net foreign assets ˜ a. First, we impose the condition
that the long-run value of a is finite. The country has to be solvent: an exploding foreign
debt ("Ponzi-game", a®−¥) should be excluded. The transversality condition rules out an
infinitely large net foreign asset position (a®¥). Second, we impose that net foreign
assets are a predetermined variable: ˜ a=˜ a0, where ˜ a0=0.
The procedure is as follows. We substitute the solutions for ˜ h and ˜ c in the third
differential equation. The resulting differential equation in ˜ a and the constants ˜ µY, ˜ hY, and
X can be solved. Imposing the conditions that a is finite for t®¥ and that ˜ a=0 for t=0, we
find a relation between ˜ h0,˜ a 0 ,˜ µ Y ,˜ h Y , and X which is the solution for X. To simplify
notation, write the third differential equation in (10) as
where
˜ xºa31˜ h+a32˜ c+a34(˜ µ Y−˜ h Y)+a36X. (AA.21)
Substituting the solutions for ˜ h and ˜ c, we can write:
. (AA.22)
Integrating and imposing the No-Ponzi game condition, we arrive at:
. (AA.23)
The terms in the first brackets equals ˜ a(0, ) which should equal ˜ a0. From this equality,
X(˜ z) follows.
The lower panel in Figures 2 and 3 in the main text is found in the following way.
First, find the relation between ˜ C and ˜ h along the stable manifold by substituting
into the second differential equation. Next, substitute the resulting
expression and the relation in the third differential equation. This gives an
30expression for ˜ a as the sum of a term multiplied by ˜ h and a term involving constants.
With ˜ a0=0, this constant should be zero (in fact this is an alternative way to find X). The
term premultiplying ˜ h is the slope of the stable manifold depicting the relation between a




Welfare at time t=0 [see (A.1)] can be written as:
, (AA.25)
where R is the cumulative growth-corrected discount rate, defined as:
. (AA.26)
Hence, welfare depends on the time path of consumption, captured by C(0) and ˆ C. Taking
total differentials, solving the resulting integrals by using the fact that all variables develop
monotonically with speed of adjustment l [see (AA.20)], and taking into account that
consumption grows at rate sg in the steady state, we derive for welfare at t=0
9:
.
9 ˜ W is defined as ˜ WºdW/[(1−r)W] so that ˜ W>0 if welfare rises [note that W<(>)0 if r>(<)1].
31